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 Executive Summary 
 
Information markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome 
of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. They can provide real-time 
information on the likely benefits and costs of different kinds of policies and projects. 
 
We argue that information markets combined with pay-for-performance contracts have 
the potential to revolutionize the way the government, the non-profit world, and the private 
sector do business. Moving to a performance-based policy paradigm could have great benefits 
for consumers and the economy. In addition to providing economic benefits, this approach could 
also promote greater accountability and transparency in the development of policy.  
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Back  in  the  1980s, a handful of academics at the University 
of Iowa’s business school came up with an idea for giving students some hands-on 
experience in trading markets like the stock and commodities markets. Rather than 
using play money to simulate trading, they created a real market in which anyone 
could bet modest sums on the outcome of future events – for example, on who would 
be the next occupant of the White House. And they convinced government regulators 
that, because the market would be primarily a teaching device, it would not require 
oversight by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Mighty oaks (well, in this case, a sapling) 
from acorns do sometimes grow: today, the 
Iowa Electronic Market (www.biz.uiowa.edu/
iem/) is a thriving nonproﬁ  t enterprise, offer-
ing markets to wager on events ranging from 
the outcomes of presidential elections to the 
periodic interest-rate decisions of the Federal 
Reserve’s Open Market Committee. 
To see how the IEM works, consider the 
winner-take-all 2004 presidential election 
market. On Oct. 16, 2004, the price of a $1 
Kerry contract was 39 cents, implying that 
the market “believed” Kerry had a 39 percent 
chance of beating Bush (in previous weeks, 
the price of a Kerry contract had ﬂ  uctuated 
from a high of 54 cents to a low of 28 cents). 
Thus, on Oct. 16, if you believed that Kerry’s 
chances of winning were better, you had the 
opportunity to put your money where your 
intuition was.
It is tempting to assume that the Iowa 
Electronic Market is just entertainment to 
make the sometimes-dreary task of learning 
to be a good securities speculator (or corpo-
rate commodities hedger) more palatable. In 
fact, so-called “information markets” are be-
ginning to get respect from the pros – and 
for good reason. Just as Las Vegas parimu-
tuel betting markets have a record of pre-
dicting the outcomes of sporting events bet-
ter than professional gamblers, prices on the 
IEM have proved more accurate than poll-
sters in forecasting elections roughly 75 per-
cent of the time. 
Why do information markets work as well 
as they do? No individual expert is likely to 
know everything there is to know about the 
probabilities. Moreover, experts have com-
plex motives – for example, the personal con-
sequences of making the wrong bet may vary 
considerably from choice to choice. If a mu-
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tual fund manager goes along with the crowd 
by betting the stock market will go up, he or 
she is unlikely to be ﬁ  red if proved wrong. On 
the other hand, if he or she bets against the 
crowd and is wrong, the error stands out. 
By contrast, anonymous markets are more 
likely to process all the available information, 
and to reward and punish bettors in a straight-
forward fashion. So the market price reﬂ  ects 
what The New Yorker columnist James Surow-
iecki calls “the wisdom of crowds” in his fas-
cinating book of the same name.
The corporate world is catching on to this 
insight. Indeed, ﬁ  rms ranging from Hewlett-
Packard to Microsoft to Goldman Sachs are 
experimenting with information markets in 
making business decisions. We believe the su-
perior ability of markets to amass and process 
information could also be harnessed in the 
service of public policymaking. These mar-
kets could improve the quality of information 
on which government bases decisions, as well 
as make politicians more accountable to the 
electorate. And in the process, information 
markets could make it more practical to en-
list private enterprise in pay-for-performance 
arrangements to meet societal needs. Such a 
policy shift could result in a genuine renais-
sance of government in an era of scarce ﬁ  nan-
cial resources and even scarcer public conﬁ  -
dence in the efﬁ  ciency and benevolence of the 
political system. 
If the idea of using markets to replace ex-
perts in predicting the seemingly unpredict-
able sounds a bit familiar – and just a bit bon-
kers – go to the head of the class. It would be 
foolish to introduce a novel way of govern-
ment decision making by picking the hardest 
case ﬁ  rst. Yet that is exactly what happened. 
In July 2003, it was disclosed that the Penta-
gon’s Defense Research Project Agency was 
planning to create a market in which trad-
ers could bet on where and when terrorists 
would strike. 
This isn’t as dumb as it looks on ﬁ  rst 
glance. We know relatively little about the 
motives or capacities of terrorists. And we are 
not inclined to trust experts, who can gain 
politically from predictions, to amass and 
process the information that is available. But 
a market for terrorism may have been un-
workable. The prices would inform the gov-
ernment about terrorists’ attack plans, but 
they would also inform terrorists about the 
government’s security plans. What’s more, 
terrorists could proﬁ  t from inside informa-
tion, leading to public outrage.
Whatever the merits, Washington proved 
unwilling to venture into this brave new 
world. “There is something very sick about it,” 
concluded Senator Barbara Boxer of Califor-
nia. “I think you ought to end the careers of 
whoever … thought that up.” 
We would offer a less damning judgment: 
those promoting information markets should 
start simpler – and in an arena that is less 
controversial.
what every policymaker 
should know
Suppose you were a policymaker assigned the 
task of improving standardized test scores 
in a failing urban public high school system, 
and decided it was worth $1 million of pub-
lic money for each point that test scores go 
up in a year. You could design a speciﬁ  c pro-
gram with the goal of raising test scores by 
10 points, and then ask private contractors 
to bid on providing the services. If someone 
were willing to undertake the task for less 
than $10 million, you would presumably go 
forward with the deal. 
Alternatively, you could create a pay-for-
performance auction, in which contractors 
were invited to bid for the right to implement 
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a program to raise test scores and to receive 
$1 million for every point that scores went up. 
Note there would be no bids unless at least 
one bidder expected to be able to improve the 
test scores for less than $1 million per point. 
For example, if a bidder thought that a $6 
million outlay for after-school tutoring would 
raise average test scores by 10 points, it would 
have an incentive to bid up to $4 million ($10 
million in pay-for-performance revenues, less 
$6 million in costs).
This is a straightforward (if somewhat 
stylized) example of an approach that is oc-
casionally employed in the public sector be-
cause it encourages contractors to use the 
most efﬁ  cient means they can devise to get 
the job done. We think this generally superi-
or approach could be made even better, how-
ever, if information markets were used in ad-
vance to inform both government ofﬁ  cials 
and potential bidders. 
For example, the government could cre-
ate a futures contract that allowed people to 
bet on how much test scores will change in 
a year if a private contractor is engaged on a 
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resemble those in futures contracts that cur-
rently allow speculators to bet on the future 
price of, say, jet fuel or wheat (and simulta-
neously permit airlines and food processors 
to lock in the future costs of vital inputs). If 
the market predicted that a pay-for-perfor-
mance approach would raise test scores a year 
hence by X points, the government could use 
the information to decide whether to go for-
ward with the program and potential bidders 
could use it to decide how much they could 
proﬁ  tably offer. 
Information markets could, in theory, 
do even more, providing insights into the 
net beneﬁ   ts of a policy initiative before it 
was even attempted. Here, futures contracts 
would be tied to the market’s estimate of what 
bidders would be willing to offer for the right 
to a pay-for-performance contract. 
In fact, social scientists have only begun to 
consider the potential value of using infor-
mation markets to inform and complement 
innovation in the public sector. For exam-
ple, with suitable tweaking, information mar-
kets could provide insights into who is likely 
to win and who is likely to lose from a given 
policy change. Thus, rather than just asking 
the market to predict how much average test 
scores would go up under a speciﬁ  ed initia-
tive, one could narrow the question to how 
much the test scores of children from low-in-
come families would go up. 
Information market contracts might even 
be used to hedge the risks associated with 
a public sector project, much the way com-
modities futures contracts are used to hedge 
against commodity price changes. For exam-
ple, if a parent were worried that education 
quality would decline after some basic policy 
change, she could bet against the policy’s suc-
cess so she would later have enough money to 
send her child to private school. Information 
market contracts would also help to ﬁ  nance 
worthwhile projects by allowing the winning 
ﬁ  rm to sell contracts at the market price. 
One can certainly pick apart our examples 
– hypotheticals are always easy game. But we 
think the established idea of pay-for-perfor-
mance contracting in the public sector aug-
mented by the new idea of using information 
markets to make the pay-for-performance 
approach more practical offers some major 
opportunities. 
testing the limits of a new idea
For shorthand (and to satisfy the policy 
wonks’ addiction to acronyms) we’ve named 
the combination “performance-based policy,” 
or just PBP.
The basic PBP paradigm is straightfor-
ward. First, the decision maker deﬁ  nes a per-
formance measure. In the case of the test 
score example, the government decided it was 
worth an additional $1 million for each point 
that average test scores improved. Second, the 
decision maker uses information markets to 
assess what the policy will deliver in terms of 
beneﬁ  ts (average test score changes). Third, 
the decision maker opts for go or no-go. If 
it’s a go, a pay-for-performance auction de-
termines who gets the contract, assuming the 
winning bid exceeds some reservation price. 
If, for example, the government wanted to 
limit net expected payouts, it could set a high 
reservation price. Fourth, the decision maker 
pays for performance. If test scores go up, the 
government pays according to how much is 
achieved; if they go down, the contractor eats 
the costs. 
As illustration of the potential advantag-
es of performance-based policy, consider the 
recent “Copenhagen consensus” – a high-
proﬁ  le attempt to set priorities for solving 
societal problems that was orchestrated by 
the Danish environmental policy entrepre-
big ideas87 First Quarter  2005 
neur Bjorn Lomborg. In May 2004, a group 
of eight distinguished economists (including 
three Nobel Prize winners) met in Copenha-
gen to consider the best ways to meet the big-
gest challenges facing the planet. To make the 
problem interesting, they assumed that gov-
ernments had an additional $50 billion to 
spend on solutions. 
The experts ranked 17 social investments 
in four categories ranging from bad to very 
good. The very-good category included in-
vestments in controlling HIV/AIDS and ma-
laria, reducing malnutrition and promoting 
free trade. The bad category included some 
investments in slowing climate change and 
instituting guest-worker labor transfer pro-
grams. To reach their decision, the experts 
relied on their collective wisdom, as well as 
research papers done by other experts and 
criticisms of those papers done by yet other 
experts. 
There’s nothing inherently wrong with 
that approach. But as we noted earlier, ex-
perts are only one source of information, and 
sometimes not a very good one. Now consid-
er an alternative: using information markets. 
Suppose the Bill and Melinda Gates Founda-
tion was considering investments in contain-
ing the spread of HIV in sub-Saharan Africa. 
It could use one market to predict the num-
ber of infections that would occur without 
intervention, while a second could predict 
the number of infections with a speciﬁ  c pol-
icy intervention – say, creating rural sex edu-
cation centers. Suppose these predictions sug-
gest that one million HIV infections could be 
avoided if the foundation paid, say, a $1,000 
fee for every HIV infection below the baseline 
number. The foundation could then decide if 
it wants to go ahead with the project. 
If it decides the project has promise, the 
foundation could use a pay-for-performance 
auction to select a contractor. In a competi-
tive auction, bids would tend to reﬂ  ect the 
difference between proﬁ  ts  (deﬁ   ned here as 
monetary payments based on reducing the 
number of HIV infections) and the private 
costs of achieving reductions in the number 
of infections. Thus, the revenues from the 
auction would provide a measure of the net 
societal beneﬁ  ts from the project, which is a 
key criterion for allocating resources wisely. 
Thinking big, health and safety regulation 
offer a variety of opportunities to apply the 
PBP paradigm. Suppose Congress decided to 
switch from command-and-control regula-
tion – as in, automakers must install airbags 
for front-seat passengers – to an approach in 
which each agency is given a budget to meet 
broad performance objectives. The objectives 
could include everything from reducing high-
way fatalities to raising childhood vaccination 
rates to improving air quality. 
The regulators would then translate these 
objectives into the pay-for-performance con-
text by attaching a monetary value to perfor-
mance improvements. And here, Congress 
could be explicit about priorities – for ex-
ample, by putting a high value on air qual-
ity (hence, visibility) in national parks or a 
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low value on coastal beach erosion. Next, the 
regulators would implement the PBP policy, 
using information markets to sharpen knowl-
edge about costs and beneﬁ  ts and then choos-
ing contractors through pay-for-performance 
auctions. 
All this would amount to a revolution in 
the provision of government services. Policy-
makers would have straightforward ways of 
measuring success and failure. Moreover, the 
process would be totally open; it would be as 
easy to see market predictions on the success 
of air quality policies as it was to ﬁ  nd the 
price of a Kerry contract on the Iowa ex-
change. And since the system would use pub-
lic markets to award contracts, it would be 
relatively difﬁ   cult for politicians to reward 
their friends or punish their enemies. 
Finally, policymakers and the public could 
use information markets to assess the like-
ly impact of prospective legislation, such as 
price controls on prescription drugs. Price 
controls, it is widely agreed, would reduce the 
incentives to develop new drugs; on the other 
hand, controls might well mean greater use of 
existing lifesaving drugs because more peo-
ple (and government agencies) could afford 
to buy them. 
Now, this is an arena in which it is hard to 
ﬁ  nd an expert without a conﬂ  ict of interest 
or an ideological bias. But information mar-
kets ﬁ  nesse the problem of generating an un-
biased prediction – self-interest in the form 
of betting one’s own money would presum-
ably drive the results in the market. And if the 
public came to view markets as a more trust-
worthy source of information, lawmakers and 
bureaucrats would be less able to shield their 
own interests or biases behind the opinions of 
their favorite experts. 
PBP hardly offers a better way in every cir-
cumstance. For example, if the government 
can’t ﬁ  gure out a practical way to pay for 
performance, PBP won’t work. On the other 
hand, if policymakers can’t deﬁ  ne success and 
failure in concrete terms, perhaps we don’t 
want them to spend public money in pursuit 
of ill-deﬁ  ned goals. 
Arguably a more serious criticism is that 
PBP is, in effect, an effort to take the politics 
out of politics. If changing the way policy is 
made reduces the power of inﬂ  uential interest 
groups, they are bound to resist the change in 
the ﬁ  rst place and attempt to subvert it once 
it is established. And since the groups most 
affected would be lawmakers and govern-
ment bureaucrats, the natural enemies of PBP 
would be in charge of implementing it.
getting from here to there
Start with what we’ve got. A variety of infor-
mation markets are already ﬂ  ying below the 
enemy radar. As noted earlier, Hewlett-Pack-
ard has experimented with information mar-
kets, sponsoring markets among employees 
to predict sales. Eli Lilly has pursued similar 
experiments to predict successful drugs. The 
Iowa Electronic Market (www.biz.uiowa.edu/
iem/markets) offers ways for anyone to bet on 
the presidential elections as well as the poli-
cies of the Federal Reserve. TradeSports (www.
tradesports.com) is a far more ambitious for-
proﬁ  t effort to create information markets in 
sports, politics, economic indicators – even 
movie box ofﬁ   ce revenues. And Goldman 
Sachs (www.gs.com/econderivs) hosts auc-
tions for derivatives based on the value of 
economic indices. 
A major hurdle in making the public 
aware of the opportunities presented by in-
formation markets is (not surprisingly) gov-
ernment. The federal government does not 
have a clear policy on whether information 
markets should be regulated as futures mar-
kets – or worse, barred as interstate gam-
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bling. And as information markets 
become better known, the states 
will be similarly tempted to regulate 
them through gambling commissions. 
Hence a critical step in advancing the use 
of information markets is to create a na-
tional policy toward them that both keeps 
federal regulators at bay and pre-empts 
all state regulation. We believe that, in the 
absence of federal legislation, the Com-
modities Futures Trading Commission 
should protect information markets from 
(other) government interference. Some 
federal legislation may be needed, however, 
to allow these markets to work.
Betting on presidential elections or box 
ofﬁ  ce results is still a fair distance, however, 
from using information markets to predict 
the impact of public policy. Making that leap 
would require some help – say, from govern-
ment research agencies and nonproﬁ  ts. The 
National Science Foundation has traditional-
ly supported research in economics. It could 
provide seed money for research on ways 
to exploit information markets for purpos-
es of policymaking Currently, we don’t know 
enough about the theoretical or practical 
properties of varying designs. Organizations 
like the World Bank could help with pilot 
projects. And the major philanthropic foun-
dations might also be enlisted, as they have a 
big stake in improving the way public priori-
ties are set and public services are delivered. 
final thoughts
This is the place where you expect policy 
wonks like us to summarize the virtues of 
their proposals, belittle the nay-sayers and 
leave the ﬁ  eld of battle in alleged triumph. 
But we know the idea of using information 
markets to revolutionize public policymak-
ing is a stretch. All we really ask of readers 
is to contemplate the failure of government-
as-usual and to suspend disbelief that radical 
ﬁ  xes could make a difference. 
To date, social scientists have focused on 
all the reasons that government has expand-
ed its reach, even as it has proved ever-less-
capable of satisfying public demands. Surely 
it makes sense to experiment with ideas that, 
however modestly, offer hope of making gov-
ernment more responsive to public needs and 
more efﬁ  cient at delivering services.
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